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Abstract
What factors affect the diffusion of new economic institutions? This paper examines this
question exploiting the introduction of the first regularized patent system which appeared in the
Venetian Republic in 1474. We begin by developing a model which links patenting activity of
craft guilds with provisions in their statutes. The model predicts that guild statutes that are more
effective at preventing outsider's entry and at mitigating price competition lead to less patenting.
We test this prediction on a new dataset which combines detailed information on craft guilds
and patents in the Venetian Republic during the Renaissance. We find a negative association
between patenting activity and guild statutory norms which strongly restrict entry and price
competition. We show that guilds which originated from medieval religious confraternities were
more likely to regulate entry and competition, and that the effect on patenting is robust to
instrumenting guild statutes with their quasi-exogenous religious origin. We also find that
patenting was more widespread among guilds geographically distant from Venice, and among
guilds in cities with lower political connection which we measure exploiting a new database on
noble families and their marriages with members of the great council. Our analysis suggests
that local economic and political conditions may have a substantial impact on the diffusion of
new economic institutions.
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Abstract
What factors aﬀect the diﬀusion of new economic institutions? This paper examines this ques-
tion exploiting the introduction of the ﬁrst regularized patent system which appeared in the
Venetian Republic in 1474. We begin by developing a model which links patenting activity of
craft guilds with provisions in their statutes. The model predicts that guild statutes that are
more eﬀective at preventing outsider’s entry and at mitigating price competition lead to less
patenting. We test this prediction on a new dataset which combines detailed information on
craft guilds and patents in the Venetian Republic during the Renaissance. We ﬁnd a negative
association between patenting activity and guild statutory norms which strongly restrict entry
and price competition. We show that guilds which originated from medieval religious confra-
ternities were more likely to regulate entry and competition, and that the eﬀect on patenting
is robust to instrumenting guild statutes with their quasi-exogenous religious origin. We also
ﬁnd that patenting was more widespread among guilds geographically distant from Venice, and
among guilds in cities with lower political connection which we measure exploiting a new data-
base on noble families and their marriages with members of the great council. Our analysis
suggests that local economic and political conditions may have a substantial impact on the
diﬀusion of new economic institutions.
Keywords: patents, competition, guilds, institutions.
JEL classiﬁcation: O33, O34, K23
1 Introduction
The social, economic, legal, and political organization of a society, its ‘institutions’, is a pri-
mary determinant of economic growth (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The impact of new
economic institutions - such as novel forms of contracts or property rights — depends on the
rate at which they are adopted and displace older institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The
development literature has identiﬁed a variety of factors that explain the international diﬀusion
of new institutions, such as human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004), culture (Tabellini, 2010), and
geography (Ashraf and Galor, 2011). On top of these macro variables, the rate of adoption of
novel economic institutions is also likely to be aﬀected by local conditions - such as industry
composition or the presence of elites - which vary at a much narrower geographical level, such
as a region or a city. The empirical evidence on the role of these micro-level factors is scarce.
In this paper, we aim to address this gap by studying the pattern of local diﬀusion of
one of the main economic institutions that governments use to increase innovation incentives
and spur economic growth: patent rights. Patents provide temporary monopoly rights over
a new technology that generate rents to the innovator and support private contracting. The
innovation literature has documented a large variation in the rate of patenting across industries
and in the perceived eﬀectiveness of patents across ﬁrms (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh, 2000). These ﬁndings have typically been interpreted as suggesting that the social and
economic value provided by intellectual property rights is highly heterogeneous. Understanding
the roots of this heterogeneity - i.e., why some inventors choose to heavily rely on patents and
why others do not - is essential for the design of patent policies. If, for example, a substantial
share of innovation occurs in industries in which patents do not play an important role, policies
that strengthen intellectual property rights may do little to raise the overall level of innovation
(Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Moser, 2012). Similarly, when only a few industries rely heavily
on patent rights, changes in patent policies may dramatically aﬀect the direction of technical
change (Moser, 2005). Finally, if the eﬀects of patent rights are highly heterogeneous across
ﬁrms and industries, it is likely that a one-size-ﬁts-all patent system, like the one currently in
place, is second best (Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012).
This paper provides new insights into the determinants of patenting activity, exploiting
the introduction of the ﬁrst regularized patent system, which appeared during the Renaissance
in the Venetian Republic. In 1474 the Venetian Senate passed a patent act that regulated
the granting of patents for novelty, ingenuity, and utility. The dominant view among patent
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law historians is that this act established an administrative-centered system, strikingly similar
to the modern Anglo-American system (Merges and Duﬀy, 2013). Therefore, the patents
awarded in the late ﬁfteenth century in the Venetian Republic provide a unique opportunity
to study the diﬀusion of a drastically new form of property rights. This is not common in the
innovation literature, where most studies typically examine marginal changes of pre-existing
patent rights (Hall and Harhoﬀ, 2012). Moreover, the historical nature of our data is useful in
understanding whether heterogeneity in the use of patents is persistent over time, or is a more
recent phenomenon linked to modern technology trends.
We begin our analysis with a simple theoretical model that describes the patenting
decision of inventors at the time of the Venetian Republic. The theoretical framework highlights
two key diﬀerences between the modern patent regime and the Venetian system. First, Venetian
patents provided not only the negative rights to exclude through monopoly power, but also the
positive rights to enter into craft guilds for innovators that were not guild members (Mandich,
1948; Sichelman and O’Connor, 2012). Second, guilds had the power to oppose and block patent
applications (Berveglieri, 1995;1999; Trivellato, 2008). We show that the interplay of these two
features implies that the level of patenting can vary substantially across guilds, and that this is
true both for guild members and for outside inventors. More speciﬁcally, the model shows that
the level of patenting in a technology area is strongly related to the ability of guild statutes
to prevent entry of outsiders and to mitigate competition among members. Greater statutory
restrictions allow guild members to extract high rents, and this increases their incentives to
prevent patenting by other members and external innovators.
Our empirical analysis exploits a new dataset which combines information on the patents
granted by the Venetian Senate with detailed digitized data on craft guilds operating in the
cities of the Venetian Republic. Our sample comprises 340 guilds of the Venetian Republic
whose statutes have been examined and coded by a team of Italian historians as part of a
research project ﬁnanced by the Italian Ministry for Education, Universities and Research.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, we show a strong negative association between
patenting in the technology sector of a guild and the presence of statutory rules which strongly
limit entry and competition. Results are robust to including controls for city and guild char-
acteristics, and to using alternative econometric models. A variety of placebo tests show that
only restrictions to entry and competition are correlated to patenting and no other provisions
in guild statutes.
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To address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit as instrumental variable
the religious origin of some of the guilds in our sample. A number of the guilds in North-
ern Italy originated from medieval religious confraternities formed a couple of centuries before
the patent act. The history literature suggests that establishment of these confraternities was
driven by idiosyncratic reasons related to the local success of religious movements in the 13th
century (Mackenney, 1994). To conﬁrm the quasi-exogenous nature of this variable, we show
that it is orthogonal to many observable guild characteristics such as industry, location and a
variety of statutory rules. At the same time, religious origin is a strong predictor for statutory
provisions restricting entry and competition. This is because religious confraternities followed
strict rules regulating members’ admission and interaction, and such rules often inspired guild
statutes (Mackenney, 1994). The instrumental variable analysis conﬁrms the negative relation-
ship between patenting and the strength of guilds’ statutes.
Our second ﬁnding is that patenting was more frequent for guilds located in cities ge-
ographically distant from Venice. This suggests that patents were particularly beneﬁcial for
non-elite inventors with limited access to political power (Khan, 2005). To study this issue
in more detail, we construct a measure of political connection exploiting a unique database of
Venetian nobility and marriages between patrician families and members of the Great Coun-
cil. We ﬁnd that guilds located in cities with less political connection were more likely to
patent their technologies, supporting the idea that politically connected guilds could substitute
intellectual property rights with other forms of formal and informal protection.
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that local economic and political conditions may
have a substantial impact on the diﬀusion of new economic institutions.
Our analysis is connected to the economic history literature on the role of craft guilds.
A common view is that medieval craft guilds were technophobic (North, 1981). Recent studies
provide a more nuanced view, recognizing that some guilds were much more receptive to novel-
ties and technological advances than others (Epstein, 2004). In her analysis of the Venetian silk
and glass production, Trivellato (2008) emphasizes the crucial role of intra-guild interactions
and argues that experimentation took place only when statutory norms were not too restrictive.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with Trivellato’s thesis, and highlight a link between guild statutes
and technology management.
While there is a growing theoretical literature examining the economics of guilds (inter
alia see Greif et al., 1994; de la Croix et al., 2016; Greif and Tabellini, 2017), one of the diﬃ-
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culties in studying these institutions is the lack of comprehensive data. Our paper contributes
to this line of research and introduces a novel dataset, which may also prove useful for future
research.
Our paper is also related to studies that investigate the eﬀects of occupational licensing.
Kleiner (2000) provides a survey of the literature. Persico (2015) develops a theory showing how
internal politics of a licensing association can lead to expansion of the licensure. Our analysis
illustrates how occupational licensing and self-regulation may interact with the diﬀusion of new
economic institutions. The role of internal rules and how they inﬂuence technology adoption
is also the focus of Bridgman (2015), who studies why unions may favor restrictive work reg-
ulations and how these regulations may induce resistance to technology adoption. Finally, our
paper adds to the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation (Aghion
et al., 2005; Cohen, 2010). Our ﬁndings suggest that market power may aﬀect not only the
level of innovation but also the propensity to rely on patent protection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the origin
and functioning of the Venetian patent system. Section 3 develops a model showing the link
between guild statutory norms and patenting. Section 4 describes the data and discusses the
econometric speciﬁcation. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Concluding remarks brieﬂy
summarize the ﬁndings and their implications.
2 Renaissance Venice and its patent system
This section provides a brief historical overview of the Venetian Republic between the ﬁfteenth
and sixteenth century, and illustrates the main features of the 1474 patent act.
2.1 The Venetian Republic in the 15th and 16th centuries
During the period of our study, the ‘Serenissima’ Republic of Venice was one of the largest
regional economies of Renaissance Europe. Its center was the maritime city of Venice with
roughly 150,000 inhabitants at the end of the 16th century, about half of the population of
north-east Italy at that time (Costantini, 1987). The Venetian state included the ‘Terraferma’
dominion, a compact and densely populated area which included large cities such as Verona and
Vicenza. Figure 1 (from Knapton, 2013) illustrates the state boundaries around the period of
our study. A number of additional cities in the Greek peninsula and in South-East Europe, such
as Corfu, Andros, and Cyprus were also under the control of the Venetian Republic and were
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instrumental ports for long-distance trade between Western Europe and the Levant (Borelli,
1980).
The Venetian Republic was based on a careful balance of power that originated as an
attempt to restrain the power of a single person or governing body and led to remarkable
political stability (Lane 1973). Membership in the main governing institutions was precluded
to lower classes, such as artisans and shopkeepers. Moreover, following the ‘Serrata’ (closure)
in 1297, political functions were restricted to a hereditary nobility that had the exclusive right
to sit in the great council, the legislative assembly of the Republic. Because of the large size of
the great council, most legislative functions were delegated to the senate, a smaller assembly
(about 300 senators) elected by the great council (Borelli, 1980). Some members of the senate
had the right of legislative initiative (‘metter parte’), others were only entitled to vote (‘metter
ballotta’). Among the senators entitled both to vote and to propose new laws, there were
three ‘Provveditori di Comun’ who also oversaw transport infrastructures and mercantile trade
(Borelli, 1980; Zaggia, 2004; Di Stefano, 2011). The doge was the personal embodiment of
the Republic, it was elected by a committee of 41 nobles chosen by the great council. In 1474
the doge was Nicolo’ Marcello, and eleven doges took oﬃce between 1474 and 1550 (Rendina,
1984).
At the time of our study, the main threat to Venice’s trade supremacy and the preser-
vation of its economic power was the Ottoman Empire, which was expanding dramatically
under the leadership of sultan Selim I (Borellli, 1980). Moreover, the 1492 discovery of Amer-
ica started shifting the center of long-distance trade away from the Mediterranean toward the
Atlantic.
The economy of the capital was driven by the vast trading activity in spices, dying
materials, silk, cotton, slaves, and precious metals (Pezzolo, 2013). On top of this vibrant
trade, artisan production also ﬂourished both in Venice and in Terraferma. The Arsenal was
one of the largest industrial sites in Europe, and glassmaking was among the most prestigious
urban occupations at the time (Trivellato, 2008). The mainland was marked by a lively wool
and silk production (Demo, 2013).
Merchants and craftsmen were organized in guilds, self-governed organizations that con-
trolled various aspects of economic activity. Guild statutes prescribed technical characteris-
tics of products and regulated entry, apprenticeship, and competition (Belfanti, 2004). The
Venetian government fostered guild membership for ﬁscal reasons, and about 20 percent of
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the population of the city of Venice belonged to a guild.1 Guild members were excluded from
government, but the Venetian constitution guaranteed them the right of judicial appeal against
the government and guild oﬃcers (Lane, 1973).
2.2 The 1474 patent act
On March 19, 1474 the Venetian senate passed by a large majority a ‘parte’ (act) regulating
the granting of patents. While there is evidence that a small number of ad-hoc privileges for
new inventions and mineral extraction were granted by the Venetian government before this act
(only ﬁve patents according to Mandich, 1936), the parte of 1474 is the very ﬁrst law regulating
the patent application and granting process, and has been recognized by numerous historians
and law scholars as the legal foundation of the modern patent system (inter alia see Mandich
1948; Duﬀy, 2007; Golden, 2013).
The act indicates that patent applications (or ‘suppliche’) were to be ﬁled with the
Provveditori di Comun and the patents (or ‘privative’) were typically granted after senatorial
approval (Berveglieri, 1995). The subject matter to be patented was required to be a “new
and ingenious device” and the eﬀect of a patent was to stop “every other person in any of
our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to said one
without the consent and license of the author” (Mandich, 1948). The novelty content was
evaluated on the basis of the technical knowledge available in the Venetian dominion, implying
that a patent could be granted to products or processes already in use elsewhere (Molà, 2014).
The patentee was required to implement the invention (‘messa in opera’) within a speciﬁed
period of time. In cases where the patentee failed to use the device, the patent was revoked
(Berveglieri, 1995).2
There are three main features of the Venetian patent system that are central to our
analysis. First, patents could be granted to all inventors regardless of their citizenship status
or guild membership. Thus, patents were both ‘negative’ rights to exclude but also ‘positive’
rights to practice the invention and operate in industries controlled by guilds (Mandich, 1948;
and Sichelman and O’ Connor, 2012). For example, Florentine inventor Cosmo Scatini was
granted a patent for high quality black silk dying, which permitted him to enroll in the dyer’s
1This share remained stable, with minor ﬂuctuations, from the 16th century until 1797, the end of the
Venetian state (Costantini, 1987).
2The act established a patent length of 10 years, but it was common for applicants to request longer protection.
Mandich (1936) describes cases in which patent rights lasted 25 and even 70 years.
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guild of Venice (Belfanti, 2004).
Second, guilds were often involved in the patent granting decision process, through the
evaluation of the novelty content of the application. This examination involved, most of the
time, a test of the new product or process (the ‘experienza’) to verify, before granting the
patent, whether the invention was actually working. Trivellato (2008) describes the opposition
of the Venetian silk spinners’ guild to the patent application of Iseppo Giovan Perin Mattiazzo
for a new hydraulic mill for spinning and throwing silk.3
Third, patent holders were expected to share the technology with guild members through
the payment of an appropriate licensing fee. Such a licensing requirement is often mentioned
in the patent records, without specifying the precise amount but requesting a “discrete sum”
of money for the transfer or payment of an “adequate reward” (Belveglieri, 1995).
While a number of historians have examined the administrative details of the Venetian
patent system and collected detailed information on patent records, very few studies have
addressed the question of why the senate passed the patent act in 1474. Lane (1973) and
May (2002) suggest that the growing economic and trading power of the Ottoman empire and
Antwerp led Venetian policy makers to focus on industrial activities. Berveglieri (1995, 1999)
and Belfanti (2004) emphasize the goal of attracting foreign inventors to the Venetian Republic
to compensate for the lost supremacy of Venetian guilds in various industrial sectors.4 Mandich
(1936) suggests that successful experimentation with monopolies in mineral rights may have
led Venetian authorities to legislate on patent rights.
3 Theoretical model
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model to describe patenting incentives in the
Venetian Republic and to examine the eﬀects of guild statutes on ﬁrms’ intellectual property
strategies.
3.1 Set-up
Consider an industry with three ﬁrms and two periods t = 1, 2. Two ﬁrms belong to a guild,
while the third one is an outsider. In the absence of innovation, guild members sell a standard
3Molà (2000) reports a number of other opposition cases, such as the 1583 spinning machine patent of Urbano
Bonturelli and the 1597 silk bleaching patent of Giacomo di Bianchi and Innocente Soardo.
4There is a growing literature which exploits historical data to study the relationship between immigration
ﬂows, growth, and innovative activities (Akcigit et al., 2017a; Akcigit et al., 2017b).
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product to consumers. The surplus created by the standard product is π per period. We assume
that the guild can appropriate a fraction α(θ) of this surplus, with α′(θ) > 0. The appropriated
surplus is shared equally among guild members. The parameter θ captures the strength of the
guild’s internal statute, with a larger value of θ indicating larger collusive power among the
members, which allows greater proﬁt extraction.
At t = 1, one of the ﬁrms develops an innovation that increases the surplus to π+∆ per
period. Innovations are distributed with cumulative distribution F (∆) with support [0,∞]. To
patent the innovation costs c and patent protection lasts for one period. The patent grants
the innovator the right to extract the full surplus for the period. The patent holder negotiates
licensing deals with the other guild members by making take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to them. At
t = 2, once the patent has expired the technology becomes freely available to all guild members.
The outsider ﬁrm cannot enter the guild without an innovation. Entry is guaranteed if
the outsider ﬁrm obtains a patent. If it innovates but does not apply for a patent, entry occurs
with probability β(θ) with β′(θ) < 0, which captures the idea that the stronger guild statutes
are, the more diﬃcult it is for an outsider to enter.
Before a patent is granted, each guild member can oppose the patent application by
paying an opposition cost, κ. If the patent is opposed, the technology is appropriated and
shared among all the guild members during both periods. If the patent of the outsider is
opposed, entry to the guild is blocked as well.
We solve the game by backward induction, starting from the opposition decision. We
distinguish two cases, depending on whether the innovation is developed by a guild member or
by the outsider ﬁrm. For simplicity, we set α(θ) = θ and β(θ) = 1−θ (we relax this assumption
in section 3.4). We also assume that π > 3c to focus on the cases in which the cost of obtaining
a patent is not too large relative to the baseline surplus.
3.2 Innovation by a guild member
We ﬁrst focus on the case in which the inventor is a guild member. Suppose that the innovator
applies for a patent and consider the incentives of the other guild member to oppose it. If op-
position takes place, the technology is shared between the two ﬁrms for two periods. Therefore,
by choosing to oppose the patent, the guild member obtains θ(π+∆)/2 per period, net of the
opposition cost, κ.
If the patent is not opposed, the innovation is freely shared among guild members only
in the second period, once the patent has expired. In the ﬁrst period, the patentee and the
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other guild member negotiate a licensing deal and the licensee obtains θπ/2, i.e., the status
quo proﬁts in the absence of innovation.5 Therefore, opposition is proﬁtable if
θ(π +∆)− κ >
θπ
2
+
θ(π +∆)
2
which is satisﬁed if
∆ > ∆(θ) = 2
θ
κ.
Notice that d
∆(θ)
dθ
< 0, which implies that guild members block patents of other guild members
more often as the strength of the internal statute increases.
Consider now the innovator’s choice of whether to apply for a patent or not. Clearly, if
it anticipates that there will be opposition (i.e., ∆ > ∆(θ)), then patenting is not proﬁtable.
Hence, applying for a patent may be beneﬁcial only when there is no opposition (when ∆ ≤
∆(θ)). In this case the proﬁts of the patentee are equal to
π +∆−
θπ
2
+
θ(π +∆)
2
− c.
Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst period, patent protection allows the ﬁrm to extract the full surplus
π +∆. At the same time, the licensing negotiation with the other member implies that θπ/2
is transferred through licensing. At t = 2, once the patent has expired, the total surplus guild
members appropriate reduces to θ(π+∆), and each of them obtains half of it. When choosing
not to patent, the innovator obtains θ(π+∆)/2 in each period because the technology is shared
starting from t = 1. Therefore, patenting is more proﬁtable than not patenting only if
π +∆−
θπ
2
+
θ(π +∆)
2
− c > θ(π +∆)
or
∆ > ∆(θ) = 2
2− θ
(c− π(1− θ)).
Notice that ∆(θ) > 0 only if θ is large enough. Moreover, d∆(θ)
dθ
> 0, which implies that
as the strength of the internal statute increases guild members patent only their more valuable
innovations, i.e., the propensity to patent decreases in θ.
The above discussion implies that the likelihood of patenting goes down as the strength
of the statute increases because guild members are less likely to apply for a patent and more
5The implicit assumption here is that in case of disagreement the innovation is not implemented for one
period until the patent is expired, so that each ﬁrm gets θπ/2. Results are robust to considering alternative
outside options, as we discuss in section 3.4.
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likely to block patents of other members. Formally, patenting occurs when ∆ ∈
∆(θ), ∆(θ)
with a probability equal to
P (θ) = F (∆(θ))− F (∆(θ))
which decreases in θ.
3.3 Innovation by an external innovator
Suppose now that the inventor is the outsider ﬁrm and consider the opposition decision. By
opposing the patent, a guild member prevents entry of the outsider and shares the technology
with the other guild member from t = 1, obtaining θ(π+∆)/2 per period net of opposition cost,
κ. Without opposition, a guild member receives a payoﬀ of θπ/2 for one period (net of paid
licensing fees) and shares the technology with the other two ﬁrms (the other guild member and
the external innovator) in the second period. Therefore, opposing the patent is more proﬁtable
than accommodating entry if
2θ
(π +∆)
2
− κ >
π
2
θ +
θ(π +∆)
3
or
∆ > ∆E(θ) = 3
2θ

κ−
π
6
θ

.
One can easily check that ∆E(θ) is decreasing in θ, i.e., opposition is more likely with high θ.6
Similar to what happens with an internal innovator, patenting is proﬁtable for the out-
sider only when there is no opposition (when ∆ ≤ ∆E(θ)). In this case, by patenting, the
external innovator obtains
π +∆− θπ +
θ(π +∆)
3
− c.
In the ﬁrst period, the innovator extracts the full surplus and strikes licensing deals with
the guild members, oﬀering θπ/2 to each of them. In the second period, the innovation is
shared among the three ﬁrms. Without a patent, the external innovator enters the guild with
probability 1−θ and the technology is immediately shared with the guild members. Therefore,
patenting is more proﬁtable than entering without patent if
6For simplicity, our focus here is on pure strategy Nash equilibria between the guild members. Similar
predictions are obtained: (i) in a model in which guild members cooperatively decide whether or not to oppose
the outsider’s patent, (ii) in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each guild member opposes
the oustider’s patent with probability p.
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π +∆− θπ +
θ(π +∆)
3
− c > (1− θ)
2θ(π +∆)
3
which occurs if
∆ > ∆E(θ) = 3c− 3π + 4πθ − 2πθ2
3− θ + 2θ2
.
One can easily check that, when π > 3c, ∆E(θ) < 0 for each θ, which implies that, absent
opposition, the external innovator always patents, no matter the strength of the guild statutes.7
Intuitively, for low values of θ, patenting is beneﬁcial because the innovator appropriates a
large share of the proﬁts generated by the innovation during the ﬁrst period. When θ is large,
patenting is useful to overcome the diﬃculties of being admitted to the guild.
Therefore, conditional on the outsider innovating, the likelihood of patenting is
P (θ) = F (∆E(θ))
which is also decreasing in θ.
3.4 Discussion
Our simple model illustrates how the propensity to patent in a technology area is aﬀected
by the strength of the statutes of the guilds operating in the ﬁeld. As the strength of the
statute increases, the collusive power of a guild goes up, and the value of the monopoly rent
generated by the patent decreases. Thus, strong statutes reduce the patenting incentives of
guild members. Moreover, statute strength allows guild members to extract high rents from
the technologies that they appropriate through patent opposition. This implies that, in the
presence of strong statutes, patents by guild and non-guild members are more likely to be
opposed. Together, these two eﬀects generate the testable prediction that patenting activity is
likely to be less prominent in technology ﬁelds in which guilds have strong statutes.
The model builds on a number of assumptions that are worthy of additional discussion.
First, to obtain a closed form threshold for the patenting and opposition strategies we set the
impact that guild statutes have on rent sharing and entry equal to α(θ) = θ and β(θ) = 1− θ.
In the appendix, we show that the main predictions are robust to considering more general
functions α(θ) and β(θ). Speciﬁcally, we show that our comparative statics hold under mild
assumptions on these functions and derive a suﬃcient condition that generalizes our main
7Assumption π > 3c implies that ∆E(0) = (3c− 3π) /3 < 0, ∆E(1) = (3c− π) /4∆E(θ) < 0 and
d∆E(θ)
dθ
> 0.
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results. Second, our baseline setting assumes that the patentee has full bargaining power during
the licensing negotiations and that it can appropriate the whole surplus of the innovation (while
the other guild members obtain the status-quo proﬁts θπ/2). In the appendix, we relax this
assumption and study a more general set-up in which the surplus is shared through Nash
bargaining. We show that our main results are robust, as long as the bargaining power of
the patentee is not too small. Finally, our model assumes that opposition cannot be avoided
through side payments from the patentee to guild members. In the appendix we extend our
setting and allow patentees to negotiate with incumbents to avoid opposition, and we show
that also in this case patenting is less likely for larger values of θ.
A feature of the Venetian patent system highlighted in our model is the opportunity for
guild members to oppose patent applications. This resembles modern administrative processes
at the European and United States patent oﬃces (Harhoﬀ and Reitzig, 2004; Hall and Harhoﬀ,
2004). Our simple model suggests that these opposition systems may have a variety of eﬀects
on entry and patenting behavior. On the one hand, opposition allows incumbent ﬁrms to
screen out ineﬃcient patenting by external innovators (i.e., technologies with ∆ < c). On
the other hand, opposition allows non-innovating incumbents to protect their short- and long-
term rents, which creates an incentive to block entry and oppose eﬃcient technologies. This
trade-oﬀ suggests that a well-designed opposition system needs to balance screening and rent-
preservation incentives.
4 Data and methods
Our empirical analysis combines data on craft guilds active in the Venetian Republic during
the Renaissance with information on the patents granted by the Venetian senate during this
period.
Our main source of data on craft guilds is the dataset ‘Istituzioni Corporative, Gruppi
Professionali e Forme Associative del Lavoro nell’Italia Moderna e Contemporanea’ (Istituzioni
Corporative, henceforth) which is the outcome of a research project ﬁnanced by the Italian
Ministry for Education, Universities and Research involving a variety of leading history de-
partments across multiple Italian universities. The goal of the project was to release a dataset
with detailed information on the universe of Italian guilds for the period 1400-1700.8
8The researchers start from the sample of 73 Italian cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1300, and
successfully retrieve information on guilds for 50 of these cities (no data were available for smaller cities in
southern Italy, where the economy was predominantly based on agriculture). The ﬁnal dataset comprises more
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Key variables include the name of each guild, the time period of its activity, and its
geographical location. The data provide a detailed description of the manufacturing operations
and trading activities of each guild. The dataset also reports a variety of indicators related to
the internal organization of the guild, such as the presence of restrictions to market competition
or the existence of a structured apprenticeship system.
Our analysis focuses on 340 craft guilds identiﬁed in Istituzioni Corporative as active in
the Venetian Republic before 1600. Costantini (1987) estimates that at the end of the 16th
century Venetian guilds included about 34,000 members, which was roughly 20 percent of the
population and about half of the economically active labor force. The guilds in our sample
capture a large fraction of the European economic activity at that time, because Venice was
the third largest city in Europe and a leading international trading center (Pezzolo, 2013).
The books by Berveglieri (1995, 1999) are our main data sources on Venetian patents, as
they report information on the patent rights granted by the senate and retrieved from the state
Archives of Venice. Berveglieri’s work extends previous research by Mandich (1936, 1948), who
classiﬁed and translated into modern Italian 109 Venetian patents for the period 1474-1550.
For the same period, Berveglieri (1995) identiﬁes 169 patents. Appendix Table A1 shows the
technological breakdown of these patents: mills account for roughly half of the inventions,
followed by drainage devices (11 percent), and hydraulic pumps (7 percent).
We manually match guilds with patents, exploiting the description of each guild’s manu-
facturing operations provided in Istituzioni Cooperative and the patent technology classiﬁcation
provided in Berveglieri (1995).
The main variables used in the empirical analysis are described below.
Patents. This is the endogenous variable in the analysis. It captures the number of
patents granted by the Venetian senate from 1474 to 1550 in the primary technological ﬁeld
of the guild. While Berveglieri (1995) reports patents for a longer period, our main analysis
focuses on patenting for the period 1474-1550 to avoid the 1575-76 plague, which had a profound
impact on the Venetian economy. Pezzolo (2013) documents the large demographic eﬀects of
the plague, with an estimated decrease in population of between 15 and 26 percent.
Guided by the work of historians, we construct a variable capturing the strength of guild
statutes. A number of statutes in our sample include restrictions on competition, such as price
than 1,000 guilds active in Italy during the period 1400-1700. Guilds for which researchers were not able to
retrieve enough information are missing from the sample -these are likely to be smaller institutions of little
economic importance. A comprehensive description (in Italian) of the data is provided in Moioli (2004).
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ﬁxing, minimum distance between workshops (‘botteghe’) or a ban on serving customers of
other guild members. Granting privileges to sons and sons-in-law of members was a typical
way to restrict entry of local potential competitors (Moioli, 2004). In some cases, such as the
goldsmith guild of Venice, entry was completely precluded to those who were not descendents
of guild members. In other statutes, entry fees or exams were required for those who were not
sons of guild members. To preclude the entry of foreigners, various statutes included additional
provisions targeting all foreigners, or speciﬁc ethnic groups. This leads us to generate the
following variable.
Strong internal regulation. This dummy variable is equal to one if the guild has
internal rules that: (i) limit competition among the members, (ii) grant privileges to sons of
guild members, and (iii) restrict entry rights of foreigners.
It is likely that all guilds operating in the Venetian Republic adopted some formal or
informal restriction to limit competition and entry. Thus, one has to interpret Strong internal
regulation as capturing guilds for which historians have identiﬁed statutory provisions that are
more severe than those of other guilds in the sample.9
We now introduce some of the other control variables to be used in our empirical analysis.
Distance to Venice. This variable captures the distance (in kms) between the city
of the guild and Venice. We construct this measure by exploiting a variety of historical maps
describing the most important transportation routes in the Venetian Republic in the period of
our study. These include the ‘Atlantic Map’ of the state Archive of Venice and various maps
in Lanaro Sartori (1985) illustrating trade routes in the Venetian Republic.10
Trade Guild. This dummy equals one for guilds that are only involved in trade and
not in manufacturing. Roughly 46 percent of the guilds in our sample are trade guilds.
Guild Members. This information is available only for 169 guilds. On average, guilds
in our sample have 164 members (with median equal to 48 and a standard deviation of 392).
Table 1 provides summary statistics and illustrates the geographical distribution of the
guilds in our sample across the main cities of the Venetian Republic. On average, there are 1.47
9Unfortunately, the Istituzioni Corporative dataset describes the exact statutory provision for only a small
subset of guilds. For most guilds the information is available only as a dummy (i.e., restriction to competition?
Y/N; Privileges to sons? Y/N, etc. . . ). This is the main reason why our empirical analysis exploits these binary
variables.
10Our results are robust to using the modern road network (from Google maps, excluding highways) as an
alternative source of distance. The correlation between the two distance measures is very high because of the
historical nature of the Italian road system (with many roads built during the Roman Empire).
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patents in the main technology ﬁeld in which a guild operates, with a standard deviation of
roughly 5 patents. About 21 percent of the guilds in our data have strong internal regulation.
Roughly 50 percent of the guilds are located in Venice. Verona, Padua, and Brescia are the
cities with more guilds in the mainland (Terraferma).
4.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
Building on the theoretical analysis of Section 3, our main econometric model focuses on the
relationship between our measure of patenting, Patentsij, related to guild i located in city j
and the indicator for the strength of internal regulation of the guild. We typically model the
conditional expectation of patenting activity as
E(Patentsij) = exp(αStrong internal regulationij + βxij + γj)
where xij is a vector of guild-speciﬁc control variables and γj is a city-speciﬁc idiosyncratic
eﬀect. The log-link formulation is appropriate in our setting because of the non-negative and
highly skewed nature of our count-based dependent variable.
Following a long-standing tradition in the economics of innovation literature (Hausman
et al., 1984), we estimate this model via Poisson, with robust standard errors to account for
over-dispersion. Consistency of the Poisson estimates is guaranteed as long as the mean of the
dependent variable is correctly speciﬁed (Gourieroux et al, 1984).
The coeﬃcient α captures the relationship between statutory provisions restricting entry
and competition and patenting in the technology area of the guild. When α < 0 strong statutes
are associated with lower patenting, which is the prediction of our theoretical model. A ﬁnding
of α = 0 would indicate that statutory clauses generating market power are not associated
with patenting in the technology area. When α > 0 we would conclude that patenting is more
frequent in technology areas in which guilds have strong statutes.
We want to emphasize that α should not be interpreted as a relationship between inno-
vation and statutory clauses. This is because the novelty content of the patents was evaluated
on the basis of the knowledge available in the Venetian dominion and patents could involve
technologies already available elsewhere (Molà, 2014). Moreover, historians have documented
substantial innovation activity by guilds for which we observe little patenting, such as the Ar-
senal or Murano’s glassblowers (Caniato, 1996; Trivellato, 2008). Thus, α speaks more to the
propensity to use intellectual property rights to protect technologies (i.e., to adopt the new
institution) than to the propensity to innovate and develop new technologies. We leave for
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future research an examination of the eﬀect of Venetian patents on city growth and innovation
investments.
5 Empirical results
Table 2 provides the ﬁrst set of results. The regressions show a strong negative association
between the patents granted in the technology ﬁeld of a guild and the strength of its internal
rules. All regressions include a control for trade guilds, which indicates substantially lower
patenting activity for this type of organization. In column 2 we control for the geographic
distance between the city in which a guild is located and Venice. The likelihood of patenting
increases with the distance from Venice, and the coeﬃcient on internal regulation remains
stable. Column 3 shows that the relationship between guild statute strength and patenting
is robust to the inclusion of city ﬁxed eﬀects. Exponentiation of the coeﬃcient implies that
patenting is roughly 65 percent lower when guilds adopt strong internal regulation. In column
4 we show that results are similar when we control for the number of guild members, even
if this restricts the analysis to a much smaller sample. The coeﬃcient on the number of
members is positive (but statistically insigniﬁcant), suggesting that patenting is more frequent
in technology ﬁelds where guilds are larger.11
Overall, the results in Table 2 document a negative correlation between patenting and
statutory provisions limiting entry and competition, which is consistent with our theoretical
model. We perform a variety of additional empirical tests to conﬁrm the robustness of this
ﬁnding. First, we show that the estimates of the strength of internal regulation and of geo-
graphical distance are unaﬀected once we include additional controls for city characteristics.
In column 1 of appendix Table A2 we show robustness to the inclusion of controls for the size
of the city measured with population in 1300, 1400, and 1500 (data from Malanima, 1998).
Interestingly, population controls do not appear to explain much of the variance in patenting
activity, suggesting that the number of patents is not simply driven by city size. In a model with
city eﬀects, column 2 of Table A2 shows that the negative correlation between strength of the
statute and patenting is robust to including a variety of additional controls for guild character-
istics, such as the age of the guild (in 1600) and a dummy for the presence of an apprenticeship
11 In unreported regressions we capture guilds with a large number of members with a dummy variable equal
to one if the number of members is above the top quintile (180 members). In such speciﬁcations the dummy is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, supporting the idea that patenting is more likely in ﬁelds
where guilds have many members.
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system.12 The regression also includes industry eﬀects for guilds in agriculture, construction,
and textile. In column 3 of Table A2 we show that results also hold when we expand the time
period, considering the patenting activity (in the main technology ﬁeld) up to 1600. Column
4 shows that results are robust including a dummy for guilds whose operations require the use
of mills. While the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on Strong internal regulation drops by about
one quarter, the correlation remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that our
results are not exclusively driven by patents related to mills.
In unreported regressions we also conﬁrm that results are robust if we use an alternative
(less restrictive) mapping between guilds and patent technology sectors. More precisely, we
construct a new dependent variable imputing to each guild patents in the two technology
sectors that are closer to the guild activity. In a second set of unreported tests, we conﬁrm
the robustness of our main ﬁndings to estimating alternative econometric speciﬁcations, such
as OLS and a linear probability model for the presence of at least one patent for the guild. We
also show that results are robust to dropping from the sample the guilds located in Venice, as
well as to dropping trade guilds.13
There is the concern that the eﬀect of statutory norms on patenting is not driven by
speciﬁc provisions related to entry and competition, but by other statutory rules. Speciﬁcally,
the reader may worry that Strong internal regulation simply captures statutes that are very
detailed, and that some other rule in these statutes may aﬀect patenting more than those related
to entry and competition. To address this concern, we perform a number of placebo tests,
constructing variables that identify statutes containing detailed regulations of guilds, activities
not directly related to entry and competition. For example, in column 5 of Table A2 the variable
Placebo equals one if the statute includes: (i) a list of manufacturing activities precluded to
women, (ii) the name of the guild’s patron saint, and (iii) a description of the hierarchical
structure of the guild. The coeﬃcient on this variable is positive, statistically insigniﬁcant, and
12De la Croix et al (2016) discuss how apprenticeship was a key determinant of knowledge transfer and
economic growth in Medieval cities.
13We also run a regression that separately includes dummies for each of the three components of the strong
guild variable (i.e., limits to competition, privileges to oﬀspring of the guild members, and limits to foreign
members). All coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant and we cannot reject that they are equal to each other. Including
the strong guild indicator together with the three dummies also leads to insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the three
individual components, but a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for strong guild, with a magnitude
similar to the one in our baseline regression. Moreover, dropping one of the components of the strong guild
dummy leads to insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, but we cannot reject that they are equal to our baseline coeﬃcient.
These robustness checks suggest that it is not only one feature of the statute that drives the eﬀect and that only
guild statutes with detailed rules on all three features correlate with lower patenting.
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small in magnitude. We obtain similar estimates (positive, small, and statistically insigniﬁcant)
with alternative placebo tests that exploit various combinations of the above variables and other
statutory clauses, such as the presence of an apprenticeship system, or of technical restrictions
on the quality of the products. These ﬁndings support the idea that patenting propensity is
strongly related to provisions in guild statutes restricting entry and competition, but not to
other statutory rules.
One may also be concerned about changes in statutory clauses over time. Two things
need to be noted here. First, Istituzioni Corporative typically relies on documents that are
contemporaneous with the patent act (Moioli, 2004). Second, historians have emphasized how
changes in guild statutes over time typically led to lower entry barriers and greater competition
(Costantini, 1987). This implies that in constructing Strong internal regulation we are more
likely to classify as strong, statutes that are not strong, and that measurement error will bias
our estimates toward zero. While the dataset provides information on whether the statute of
a guild changes over time, we do not know the exact clauses that are aﬀected by the change,
which precludes us from using the longitudinal nature of the data. Nonetheless, we exploit this
information to perform robustness tests. Speciﬁcally, we identify statutes that changed during
the period 1474-1550. In roughly 81 percent of the sample there was no statutory change
during the time period, for about 18 percent of the guilds the statute was changed once, and
for the remaining 1 percent it was changed twice. In column 6 of Table A2 we show that our
baseline estimates are robust to dropping guilds that change their statutes during our sample
period. The coeﬃcient is roughly 15 percent larger than our baseline, conﬁrming the idea that
measurement error biases our estimates toward zero.14
We turn next to two extensions that are of independent interest.
First, we examine whether the determinants of patenting diﬀer between local and foreign
inventors. We obtain information on the origin of the inventor from Berveglieri (1995) that
shows that only 6.5 percent of the patents in the sample were granted to foreign inventors.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 3 show statistically signiﬁcant associations between geographical
distance and strength of internal rules for patenting both of local and of foreign inventors. The
magnitude of these correlations is much smaller for foreign inventors. Nonetheless, our estimates
show that the characteristics of the city and the guild seem to aﬀect patenting propensity of
14We conﬁrm this result in regressions: (i) that include a control for statutory changes, and (ii) consider
changes over diﬀerent time windows.
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inventors independently of their origin. It is possible to reconcile the larger magnitude of the
eﬀect for local inventors with our theoretical model. In fact, under standard assumptions on
the distribution of the parameter ∆ (e.g. uniform, exponential, etc.) the derivative of the
probability of patenting with respect to θ has a smaller magnitude for external innovators than
for guild members.15
Second, we examine the relationship between statutory clauses and patenting, exploit-
ing a diﬀerent source of patent data. Speciﬁcally, rather than matching guilds and patents
using the data and the technology classiﬁcation of Berveglieri (1995, 1999), we construct a
new dependent variable that relies on the patents collected and described by Mandich (1936).
Interestingly, this smaller sample also includes information on the geographical scope of patent
rights. Even though the wording of the 1474 act indicates that patents were enforceable in
the entire dominion, about 12 percent of the patents described in Mandich (1936) appear en-
forceable only in speciﬁc locations (e.g. only in Venice or other speciﬁc cities). We use this
information to construct an alternative measure of patenting that imputes patents with limited
geographical scope only to the guilds located in the relevant cities. Columns 5 and 6 show
that our results on the geographical distance and on the strength of internal rules are robust
to exploiting this alternative data source.
5.1 Instrumenting guild’s regulation strength
Our analysis has shown a strong negative association between the strength of a guild’s internal
rules and patenting in the technology area in which the guild operates, which is consistent with
the predictions of our theoretical framework. We have documented robustness of this ﬁnding in
a variety of speciﬁcations that include city eﬀects and control for several guild characteristics.
But still, to interpret this result causally is challenging, because unobservable variables may be
correlated both with Strong internal regulation and with patenting.
In particular, there are two alternative explanations that need to be addressed. First,
guilds with strong statutes may be more likely to operate in technology areas in which secrecy
can be used more eﬀectively and there is less need for patents. Speciﬁcally, the concern is that
Strong internal regulation is spuriously correlated with low information leakages, which would
imply that our estimates do not capture the eﬀect of statutory clauses restricting market power.
15Following Berveglieri (1995), we refer to an inventor as foreign if he is not Italian. Results are similar if
we extend the deﬁnition to non-members of the Venetian Republic (about 20 percent of patents were held by
foreign inventors with this deﬁnition).
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Our industry controls partially address this concern, because information leakages are likely to
be similar for guilds operating within the same industry. Moreover, one would expect guilds
facing high information leakages to be more likely to adopt clauses to restrict entry, which
would generate a positive rather than a negative correlation between patenting and Strong
internal regulation.16
Second, the 1474 patent act may have been introduced as a response to technology shocks
aﬀecting guilds without strong statutes, or as a political move to curb the power of stronger
guilds. There are two reasons why we think this is unlikely. First, one would expect the Venetian
government to react to technology shocks in speciﬁc industries with targeted policies rather
than with a one-size-ﬁts-all patent act aﬀecting all the guilds in the dominion (we describe
examples of such targeted policies in section 5.2). Second, senatorial records show that the act
passed with a very large majority (116 votes in favor, 10 against, and 3 abstentions), which is
inconsistent with a politically contentious act harming powerful guilds (Berveglieri, 1995).
Addressing these issues and other unobservable heterogeneity concerns more construc-
tively requires an instrumental variable correlated with the presence of statutory norms re-
stricting entry and competition and uncorrelated with patenting strategies. In this section, we
propose an instrument that relies on the religious origin of some of the guilds in our sample.
A number of the guilds active in the Venetian Republic during the Renaissance ﬁnd their
origin in religious confraternities that arose from the spread of the Flagellant movement during
the 13th century. A confraternity (also called ‘scola’ or ‘fratalea’) was an association of lay
people driven by Christian devotion and works of charity (Gasparini, 1987). While people from
all social classes could join a confraternity, most of the members were craftsmen. Confraternity
members were required to follow rules and bylaws in exchange for help in times of hardship
and the security of a good funeral (Monticolo, 1896; Pullan, 1971).
During the 14th and 15th centuries the Venetian government promoted the formation
of craft and trade guilds as a way to collect tax revenue and to recruit soldiers, and this led
members of confraternities to set up craft guilds linked to the various confraternities (Constan-
tini, 1987; Gasparini, 1987). For example, in Venice the guild of ironmongers was connected to
the confraternity of San Lorenzo, ﬁshermen with that of San Nicolò, and goldsmiths with San
16At the time of our study, knowledge circulation was closely linked with circulation of people, and enforcement
of trade secrets required restrictions to guild access and cooperation between members. Therefore, in our model
one can interpret the larger surplus appropriation from an increase in θ as capturing both greater market power
and lower information leakage.
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Mattio’s (Mackenney, 1994).17
Istituzioni Corporative shows that roughly 30 percent of the guilds in our sample orig-
inated from a religious confraternity. There is no clear pattern linking the religious origin of
guilds with their geographic location or their industry. For example, the barbers’ guild in
Verona originated from a confraternity, but none of the barber guilds in the other cities in
the sample have religious origins. Similarly, the blacksmiths’ guild of Udine is linked to a
confraternity, whereas those of Padua, Venice and Vicenza are not.
More than half of the guilds in Venice are linked to a confraternity, whereas in the other
cities the proportion is typically below 20 percent. Nonetheless, once we control for city eﬀects,
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant correlation between the religious origin of the guild and other
observable characteristics, such as its age, the presence of an apprenticeship system, or the
industry. Table A3 in the appendix illustrates this result in a series of regressions in which
religious origin is the dependent variable. In all cases the correlations are close to zero and
statistically insigniﬁcant. These results support the idea that the religious origin of a guild
is likely to be driven by idiosyncratic reasons related to the local success of the Flagellant
movement centuries before the patent act, and thus unlikely to be correlated with shocks
aﬀecting patenting strategies after 1474.
Historians also documented how religious confraternities followed a strict set of rules -
which were recorded in a book called ‘Mariegola’- regulating both admission of new members
and day-to-day interactions among members (Monticolo, 1892; 1896; Gasparini, 1987). Statutes
of guilds that originated from confraternities were often inspired by the Mariegolas of the related
confraternities (Mackenney, 1994). Moreover, entry restrictions may have been required to limit
access to the public good provided by the associated confraternity (Greif and Tabellini, 2017).
This suggests that guilds with religious origin were more likely to adopt internal rules restricting
entry and competition.
In Table 4 we exploit the linkages between guilds and confraternities as instrumental
variable. Column 1 reports the ﬁrst stage regression, which indicates a strong positive correla-
tion between the religious origin of the guild and the strength of its internal rules. Columns 2
and 3 contrast the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates of similar linear regression models.
Both speciﬁcations conﬁrm the strong negative relationship between patenting and the guild’s
17These connections generated obligations on both sides. For example, guilds were required to make ﬁnancial
contributions to the confraternity, but were also allowed to use the confraternity venues as meeting places.
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internal rules. The estimates of the IV regression are larger in magnitude but not statistically
diﬀerent from those in the OLS model. The larger magnitude of the coeﬃcient is consistent
with measurement error in statutory strength biasing the estimates toward zero, as discussed
above.18
Following Galasso et al (2013), we also instrument Strong internal regulation with the
predicted probability of a strong statute obtained from a probit model in which the endogenous
variable is regressed on the instrument and other ﬁrst-stage covariates. When the endogenous
regressor is a dummy, this estimator is asymptotically eﬃcient in the class of estimators where
instruments are a function of the religious origin of the guild and other covariates (Wooldrige,
2002). The 2SLS estimate with this alternative model is essentially identical in magnitude and
of stronger statistical signiﬁcance than the one presented in column 3 of Table 4.19
One concern with our IV strategy is that the religious origin of the guild may be correlated
not only with statutory clauses on competition and entry, but also with other unobservable
characteristics aﬀecting patenting. For example, religious guilds may be more risk averse, i.e.,
less likely to implement changes in their statutes and business practices, and therefore less
likely to use patents internally and more likely to oppose patents of external innovators. While
we cannot rule out this possibility, in column 3 of Table A3 we show that guilds originating
from religious confraternities were as likely to change their statutes during the period of our
study as those not linked to religious confraternities. This ﬁnding mitigates the concern that
the religious origin of a guild is simply a proxy for the risk aversion of the guild many decades
in the future.
5.2 Distance from Venice and patenting
Our empirical analysis has shown that patenting was more pronounced in technology ﬁelds of
guilds located in cities geographically distant from Venice. A possible interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that formal protection through patent documents was more beneﬁcial to innovators
operating further away from the center of political activity. In other words, innovators who
were close to Venice may have had access to alternative (formal or informal) mechanisms to
18We obtain qualitatively similar results with an IV Poisson model, but our estimates are much larger in this
case. We also experience convergence issues with some speciﬁcations of the IV Poisson model, which are common
for this estimator, as described in Silva and Tenreyro (2011).
19Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), we exploit the ﬁrst stage estimates to compute the proportion of the
treated who are compliers which is 0.22. This indicates that our estimates are not speciﬁc to a small compliant
subpopulation.
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protect their technologies.
To explore in more detail this issue, we develop an additional measure capturing the
political strength of each city. To construct this variable, we collect data on the noble families
residing across the diﬀerent cities of the Venetian Republic and their marriages with members
of the great council, the legislative assembly of the Republic. After the 1297 serrata, great
council membership was patrilineal hereditary and this restricted political power to families of
‘nobili veneti’ the high nobility of the Venetian Republic. While the vast majority of these high
nobles resided in Venice, in the other cities of the dominion some families were recognized with
lower nobility statuses such as ‘nobili’, ‘conti’ or ‘nobili palatini’. Marriages between nobles
residing in a city and members of the great council could be used strategically to increase the
political inﬂuence and create stronger connection between the city and the center of political
power.20
To identify high and low nobility families residing in each city of our sample we digitize
the census of the patrician families residing in Veneto and nearby regions compiled in the
nineteenth century by Schroeder (1830). For each noble family Schroeder reports the date in
which the family obtains the nobility title and the city in which it resides. This allows us to
identify the number of noble families residing in each city at the time of the patent act. On
average there are about 60 noble families for each city in our sample. More than 100 noble
families were located in Venice and smaller cities, such as Udine or Treviso, had less than 30
families.21
We combine this digitized census of patrician families with additional data to generate
our measure of political power. First, exploiting the information in Raines (2004), we identify
the names of the families with great council membership. Second, we obtain data on marriages
involving a noble husband during the period 1400-1599. Records of these marriages are available
from the ‘Avogaria di Comun’ of the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. Puga and Treﬂer (2014)
digitized these records, building on the work of nineteenth century archivists. Combining these
data sources, we construct the indicator variable Politically connected families, which equals
one if we identify in the city at least one family belonging to the great council or linked through
20Other studies in economics and sociology have examined the network of marriages in Medieval Italy. Padgett
and Ansell (1993) show that the success of the Medici family in Florence was driven by strategic marriage
alliances. Puga and Treﬂer (2014) document the use of marriage alliances in Venice to monopolize the galley
trade.
21Six observations had to be dropped from our sample because they are associated with smaller cities that
were not covered by Schroeder (1830).
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marriage to a family in the great council.22
In column 1 of Table 5 we show that there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
correlation between the number of noble families in a city and patenting by the guilds in the
city. At the same time, the regression also shows that the number of noble families in a city
explains much more of the variance in patents than does its population. Including these controls
has no eﬀect on the estimates of the eﬀect of geographical distance and internal strength of
the guild. This ﬁnding suggests that patenting is not simply driven by the sheer size of the
city, but it is likely to be related to other regional characteristics. For example, the presence
of noble families in a city may aﬀect the quality of its human capital and the availability of
ﬁnancing, and thus spur technological activity.
In column 2 we introduce the variable Politically connected families, which captures the
political strength of the city. We ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant association between
the presence of politically connected families and patenting, suggesting that formal intellectual
property protection may have been a substitute for alternative forms of protection available to
guilds with stronger political connections.
There is the concern that the results of columns 1 and 2 are driven by Venice because
most of the noble families and members of great council resided in Venice or because of other
legal and judicial diﬀerences with other cities (Knapton, 2013). To address this issue, in column
3 we drop from our sample all the Venetian guilds. All our ﬁndings are robust to focusing on
this smaller sample of guilds located in Terraferma.
An additional concern is that more distant cities diﬀer in their human capital or growth
potential and this may be correlated with their political power and the propensity to patent.
An important determinant of growth and human capital for European cities in the 1400s was
the availability of the printing press, as documented by Dittmar (2011). To take this issue into
account, we collect data on the number of printed books available in each city of our sample
in 1500. This information is obtained from ‘ Incunabula Short Title Catalogue,’ a database of
the British Library that includes nearly all books printed in Europe before the year 1501. For
each item, the dataset provides authors, titles, language and, more importantly for our scope,
date and place of printing. In column 4 of Table 5, we introduce this control and ﬁnd a positive
but statistically insigniﬁcant correlation between the number of books in a city and patenting.
22More than half of the cities in our sample are not connected to the great council according to this measure.
We use an indicator variable because of the limited variance in this variable (apart from Venice, in all the other
cities the number of linked families ranges between 0 and 3).
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At the same time, all other results on geographical distance and political power are robust.23
Many other factors may vary across cites, and it is quite likely that omitted variables
correlated with geographical and political distance are important for the propensity to patent.
Nonetheless, the correlations reported in Table 5 suggest that the diﬀusion of patents was
shaped by geographic and political forces. From a theoretical perspective, the relationship
between patenting and political or geographical distance from Venice is ambiguous. On the
one hand, patents might have been easier to enforce for inventors located closer to the capital.
On the other hand, inventors and guild members with greater political connections might
have been able to obtain protection from the government through other formal or informal
channels. Our empirical evidence suggests that the second eﬀect dominated the ﬁrst, and that
patents were not as widespread among guilds located in the proximity of Venice and among
those in cities with stronger political ties. A variety of historical accounts can support this
interpretation of our ﬁndings. First, the Giustizia Vecchia - which was the main magistracy
enforcing guild statutes and solving disputes between guild members- was located in Venice
(Monticolo, 1892; Shaw, 2002). Closer interaction with guilds located in the vicinity of Venice
may have allowed resolution of disputes on new products and processes without the need of
formal patent documents. Second, some of the guilds located in the proximity of Venice - such
as those active in the Arsenal or Murano’s glassblowers - were under close scrutiny by the
Venetian government, which often passed laws to complement their statutes and to provide
additional regulation of the sector. Some of these guild-speciﬁc regulations involved technology
adoption. Caniato (1996) describes various legislative acts related to the Arsenal guild members
that protected local production (e.g. by burning ships not built in Venice) and that rewarded
selected foreign shipbuilders. Davanzo Poli (1984) describes a senate decision in 1462 that
contained provisions supporting the tanner and shoemaker guilds of Venice. Manno (1995)
describes similar forms of protection for glassmakers, blacksmiths, and the silk guild of Venice.
Our ﬁnding that patents were especially valuable to innovators located in frontier cities
without political connections is also related to Khan’s analysis of the origin of modern patent
rights. Khan (2005) argues that the British and French patent systems were designed to
support and increase the market power of elites. Diﬀerently, she shows that the United States
system was more democratic, with patents accessible to non-elite inventors. In this respect,
23We obtain similar qualitative and quantitative estimates in regressions run on the smaller sample in which
observations are collapsed at the city level.
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our ﬁndings suggest that the American patent system was closer to the Venetian experience
than were the French and British laws.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the diﬀusion of patent rights in the Venetian Republic following the
1474 senate act, which instituted the very ﬁrst regularized patent system. There are two key
empirical ﬁndings in the paper. First, we ﬁnd a strong negative association between the number
of patents granted in the technology sector of a guild and the presence of statutory provisions
limiting entry and competition. Second, we ﬁnd that patenting was more frequent for guilds
located in cities geographically distant from Venice and in cities with lower political connection.
Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that the diﬀusion of new economic institutions may be
strongly aﬀected by features of the local economic and political environment. This has potential
implications for the design of patent policies, because it suggests that policy outcomes may vary
substantially across locations and industries, even within a region. Our estimates are also in
line with the more recent innovation literature, which has documented substantial variation in
the rate of patenting across industries and in the perceived eﬀectiveness of patents across ﬁrms
(Levin et al., 1987; Schankerman, 1998; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Our data show
that even in the very ﬁrst patent system, the private economic value provided by intellectual
property rights appears highly heterogeneous. Finally, our analysis underscores the importance
of considering the potential substitution between new institutions and existing alternatives.
While our results provide new insights into the diﬀusion of the very ﬁrst patent rights,
they do not imply that greater patenting is equivalent to greater innovation. If anything,
historians have documented substantial innovation activity by guilds for which we observe little
patenting, such as the Arsenal or Murano’s glassblowers (Caniato, 1996; Trivellato, 2008). We
leave for future research an examination of the eﬀect of Venetian patents on city growth and
innovation investments.
26
References
[1] Akcigit, Ufuk, John Grigsby, and Tom Nicholas (2017a) “The Rise of American Ingenuity:
Innovation and Inventors of the Golden Age,” NBER Working Paper 23047
[2] Akcigit, Ufuk, John Grigsby, and Tom Nicholas (2017b) “Immigration and the Rise of
American Ingenuity,” American Economic Review 107: 327-31
[3] Acemoglu, Daron, and Ufuk Akcigit (2012) “Intellectual property rights policy, competi-
tion and innovation,” Journal of the European Economic Association 10: 1-42
[4] Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2005) “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy 113: 949-995
[5] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2005) “The rise of Europe: At-
lantic trade, institutional change, and economic growth,” American Economic Review 95:
546-579
[6] Aghion, Philippe, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griﬃth, and Peter Howitt (2005)
“Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 120: 701-728
[7] Angrist, Joshua David and Jörn-Steﬀen Pischke (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics: an
empiricist’s companion, Princeton university press, Princeton
[8] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor (2011) “Cultural diversity, geographical isolation, and
the origin of the wealth of nations,” National Bureau of Economic Research working paper
17640
[9] Belfanti, Carlo (2004) “Guilds, patents, and the circulation of technical knowledge: North-
ern Italy during the early modern age,” Technology and culture 45: 569-589
[10] Berveglieri Roberto (1995), “Inventori Stranieri a Venezia (1474-1797). Importazione di
tecnologia e circolazione di tecnici artigiani inventori,” Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Venezia.
[11] Berveglieri Roberto (1999), Le vie di Venezia. Canali lagunari e rii a Venezia: Inventori,
brevetti, tecnologia e legislazione nei secoli XIII-XVIII, Cierre, Verona
[12] Borelli, Giorgio (1980) Stato Economia e Societa’ nella Repubblica Veneta tra ‘400 e ‘700,
Libreria Universitaria Editrice, Verona
27
[13] Bridgman, Benjamin (2015) “Competition, work rules and productivity,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 32: 136-149
[14] Caniato, Giovanni (1996) “L’Arsenale: maestranze e organizzazione del lavoro,” in Tenenti
and Tucci, Storia di Venezia: dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, Istituto della
enciclopedia italiana, Roma
[15] Cohen, Wesley, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual
assets: Appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing ﬁrms patent (or not),”
NBER working paper 7552
[16] Cohen, Wesley (2010), “Fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and perfor-
mance,” in Brownyn Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, Handbook of The Economics of Innova-
tion, North-Holland, Amsterdam
[17] Costantini, Massimo (1987), L’albero della libertà economica: il processo di scioglimento
delle corporazioni veneziane, Arsenale, Venezia.
[18] David de la Croix, Matthias Doepke, Joel Mokyr (2016), “Clans, Guilds, and Markets:
Apprenticeship Institutions and Growth in the Pre-Industrial Economy,” NBER Working
Paper No. 22131
[19] Davanzo Poli, Doretta (1984) “I mestieri della Moda a Venezia nei sec. XIII-XVIII ”
Edizioni del Gazzattino 1: 139-140
[20] Demo, Edoardo (2013) “Industry and production in the venetian terraferma,” in Dursteler,
Eric. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797, Brill, Leiden
[21] Di Stefano, Giovanni (2011) Enciclopedia Storica di Venezia, Supernova, Venezia
[22] Dittmar, Jeremiah (2011) “Information technology and economic change: the impact of
the printing press,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: 1133-1172
[23] Duﬀy, John (2007) “Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation,” Texas Law
Review 86: 1-73
[24] Dursteler, Eric (2013) “A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797,” Brill, Leiden
[25] Epstein, Stephan (2004) “Property rights to technical knowledge in premodern Europe,
1300-1800,” American Economic Review 94: 382-387
28
[26] Galasso, Alberto, Mark Schankerman, and Carlos J. Serrano (2013) “Trading and enforcing
patent rights,” RAND Journal of Economics 44: 275-312
[27] Gasparini Giuseppina (1987) “Il Movimento delle Confraternite nell’Area Veneta,” Publi-
cations de l’École française de Rome 97: 361-394
[28] Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004)
“Do institutions cause growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271-303
[29] Golden, John M. (2013) “Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors,”
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 26: 545-553
[30] Gourieroux, Christian, Alain Monfort, and Alain Trognon (1984) “Pseudo maximum like-
lihood methods: Applications to Poisson models,” Econometrica 52: 701-720
[31] Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (1994) “Coordination, commitment,
and enforcement: The case of the merchant guild,” Journal of Political Economy 102:
745-776
[32] Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini (2017) “The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining
Cooperation in China and Europe,” Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
[33] Hall, Bronwyn and Dietmar Harhoﬀ (2004) “Post-grant reviews in the US patent system–
design choices and expected impact,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal : 989-1015
[34] Hall, Bronwyn and Dietmar Harhoﬀ (2012) “Recent research on the economics of patents,”
Annual Review of Economics 4: 541-565
[35] Harhoﬀ, Dietmar and Markus Reitzig (2004) “Determinants of opposition against EPO
patent grants–the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals,” International Journal of
Industrial Organization 22: 443-480
[36] Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn Hall, and Zvi Griliches (1984) “Econometric Models for Count
Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship,” Econometrica 52: 909-38
[37] Khan, B. Zorina (2005) “The Democratization of Invention: patents and copyrights in
American economic development, 1790-1920” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
[38] Kleiner, Morris, (2000) “Occupational licensing,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:
189-202
29
[39] Knapton Michael (2013) “The terraferma state,” in Dursteler, Eric. A Companion to
Venetian History, 1400-1797, Brill, Leiden
[40] Lane, Frederic (1973) Venice. A Maritime Republic, John Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore
[41] Lanaro Sartori Paola (1985) “Venezia e le grandi arterie del commercio internazionale:
strade, ﬂusso di merci, organizzazione dei trasporti tra ‘500 e ‘700,” in Borelli Giorgio (a
cura di), Mercanti e vita economica nella Repubblica Veneta (secoli XIII-XVIII), Banca
Popolare di Verona, Verona
[42] Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R., & Griliches, Z.
(1987) “Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 3:783-831
[43] Machlup, Fritz, and Edith Penrose (1950) “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century,” Journal of Economic History 10:1-29
[44] Malanima, Paolo (1998), “Italian Cities 1300-1800. A quantitative approach,” Rivista di
Storia Economica 14, 91-126
[45] Mandich, Giulio (1936), “Le privative industriali veneziane : 1450-1550,” Rivista del
Diritto Commerciale 34, 101-143
[46] Mandich, Giulio (1948) “Venetian Patents (1450-1550),” Journal of the Patent and Trade-
mark Oﬃce Society 30: 166-189
[47] Manno, Antonio (1995) I mestieri di Venezia. Storia, arte e devozione delle corporazioni
dal XIII al XVIII secolo, Biblos, Cittadella
[48] May, Christopher, (2002) “The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, legal innovation and
the institutional origins of intellectual property”, Prometheus 20: 159-177
[49] Mackenney Richard (1994) “Continuity and change in the scuole piccole of Venice, c. 1250
- c. 1600,” Reinassance Studies 8: 388-403
[50] Merges, Robert P., and John F. Duﬀy (2013) Patent law and policy: Cases and materials,
Carolina Academic Press, Durham
30
[51] Moioli, Angelo (2004), “I Risultati di un’Indagine sulle Corporazioni nelle Città Italiane
in Età Moderna,” in Dalla Corporazione al Mutuo Soccorso. Organizzazione e Tutela del
Lavoro tra XVI e XX Secolo, Paola Massa e Angelo Moioli editori. Franco Angeli Edizioni,
Milano
[52] Molà, Luca (2000) The silk industry of Renaissance Venice, Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore
[53] Monticolo, Giovanni (1892) L’Uﬃcio della giustizia vecchia a Venezia dalle origini sino al
1330, Volume II, A spese della Società, Venezia
[54] Monticolo, Giovanni (1896) I Capitolari delle arti veneziane, Forzani EC tipograﬁ del
senato, Roma.
[55] Moser, Petra (2005) “How Do Patent Laws Inﬂuence Innovation? Evidence from Nine-
teenth Century World’s Fairs,” American Economic Review 94:1214-1236
[56] Moser, Petra (2012) “Innovation without Patents — Evidence from World’s Fairs” Journal
of Law and Economics 55: 43-74
[57] North, Douglass (1981) Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York
[58] Padgett, John and Christopher Ansell (1993) “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici,
1400—1434,” American Journal of Sociology 98: 1259—1319.
[59] Persico, Nicola (2015) “The political economy of occupational licensing associations,” Jour-
nal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31: 213-241
[60] Pezzolo, Luciano (2013) “The venetian economy” in Dursteler, Eric. A Companion to
Venetian History, 1400-1797. Brill, Leiden
[61] Pullan, Brian (1971), Rich and poor in Renaissance Venice: the Social Institutions of a
Catholic State, to 1620, Harvard University Press.
[62] Schankerman, Mark (1998) ”How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology
Field,” RAND Journal of Economics 29, 77-107
[63] Schroeder Franz (1830) Repertorio genealogico delle famiglie confermate nobili e dei titolati
nobili esistenti nelle Provincie Venete, Vol. 1 and 2, Forni, Bologna
31
[64] Shaw, James (2002) “Retail, Monopoly, and Privilege: the Dissolution of the Fishmongers’
Guild of Venice, 1599,” Journal of Early Modern History 6: 396-427.
[65] Sichelman, Ted and Sean O’Connor (2012), “Patents as Promoters of Competition: The
Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic,” San Diego Law Review 49: 1267-82
[66] Silva, Santos and Silvana Tenreyro (2011) “Poisson: some convergence issues,” Stata Jour-
nal 11: 207-212
[67] Tabellini, Guido (2010) “Culture and institutions: economic development in the regions
of Europe,” Journal of the European Economic Association 8: 677-716
[68] Trivellato, Francesca (2008) “Guilds, Technology, and Economic Change in Early Modern
Venice,” in Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800, eds. S.R. Epstein
and Maarten Prak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 199-231.
[69] Puga Diego and Dan Treﬂer (2014), “International Trade and Institutional Change: Me-
dieval Venice’s Response to Globalization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129: 753-821
[70] Raines Dorit (2004), “Cooptazione, aggregazione e presenza al Maggior Consiglio: le casate
del patriziato veneziano, 1297-1797,” Storia di Venezia 1:1-64
[71] Rendina, Claudio (1984) I dogi, Newton Compton Editori, Roma
[72] Zaggia, Stefano (2014) “Far la città: Il ruolo dei Provveditori di Comun nell’evoluzione
dell’ambiente urbano di Venezia. Strade, ponti, pozzi, case,” Mélanges de l’Ecole française
de Rome Italie et Méditerranée 116: 665-681
32
Appendix: Extensions of the theoretical model
Generalized impact of guild statutes
In this Appendix we extend our baseline model generalizing the impact that guild statutes
have on rent sharing, α(θ), and entry, β(θ). We assume that the ability to appropriate rents
increases with θ, α′(θ) > 0 while the probability of entry decreases, β′(θ) < 0. Finally, we
assume that α(0) = β(1) = 0 and α(1) = β(0) = 1.
We analyze ﬁrst the case in which a guild member is the innovator. As in Section 3, we
solve the model by backward induction considering ﬁrst the opposition decision. Opposition is
proﬁtable if
2α(θ)(π +∆)
2
− κ >
α(θ)π
2
+
α(θ)(π +∆)
2
which is satisﬁed if
∆ > ∆(θ) = 2
α(θ)
κ.
Notice that d
∆(θ)
dα
< 0 which combined with α′(θ) > 0 implies that, as the strength of the
internal statute increases, guild members block patents of other guild members more often. If
the innovator anticipates opposition it will not apply for a patent. If, instead, ∆ ≤ ∆(θ) the
guild member will patent when:
π +∆−
α(θ)π
2
+
α(θ)(π +∆)
2
− c >
2α(θ)(π +∆)
2
or
∆ > ∆(θ) = 2 (c− π(1− α(θ)))
2− α(θ)
.
Notice that ∆(θ) > 0 only if α(θ) is large enough. Moreover d∆(θ)
dα
> 0 which com-
bined with our assumption that α′(θ) > 0 implies that, as the strength of the internal statute
increases, guild members patent only their more valuable innovations and the propensity to
patent decreases in θ. This also shows that our results on opposition and patenting by guild
members presented in the text are robust to assuming a more general relationship between
rent-sharing and θ.
Consider now the case of an external innovator. A guild member ﬁnds opposing the
patent more proﬁtable than accommodating it when:
2α(θ)
(π +∆)
2
− κ >
π
2
α(θ) +
α(θ)(π +∆)
3
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or
∆ > ∆E(θ) = 3
2α(θ)

κ−
α(θ)π
6

It is easy to see that ∆E(θ) is decreasing in α(θ). This, combined with our assumption that
α′(θ) > 0, implies that the likelihood of opposition increases in θ. When ∆ ≤ ∆E(θ) and the
external innovator anticipates the patent will not be opposed, patenting is more proﬁtable than
entry without patent if
π +∆− α(θ)π +
α(θ)(π +∆)
3
− c > β(θ)
2α(θ)(π +∆)
3
that occurs if
∆ > ∆E(θ) = 3c− 3π + 2πα(θ) + 2πα(θ)β(θ)
α(θ)− 2α(θ)β(θ) + 3
Given that α(0) = β(1) = 0 and α(1) = β(0) = 1, it follows that ∆E(0) = (3c− 3π) /3
and ∆E(1) = (3c− π) /4 which are both negative because π > 3c. Moreover, we have that
d∆E(θ)
dθ
= 3
3π − c+ 2β(θ)c
(α(θ)− 2α(θ)β(θ) + 3)2
α′(θ)
+6α(θ)
c+ πα(θ)
(α(θ)− 2α(θ)β(θ) + 3)2
β′(θ)
which is positive under the following condition:
−
α′(θ)
β′(θ)
≥
2(α(θ)(c+ πα(θ)))
3π − c+ 2β(θ)c
The right hand side of the above inequality is bounded by (2c+ 2π)/(3π − c) which in turn is
bounded by 1 because π > 3c. This implies that |α′(θ)| ≥
		β′(θ)		 is a suﬃcient condition for
d∆E(θ)
dθ
≥ 0. In other words, patenting decreases in θ when changes in the statute strength have
greater impact on rent sharing than on entry.
Generalized licensing negotiations
In the baseline setting, the innovating ﬁrm has the full bargaining power during the licensing
negotiations and it appropriates the whole surplus of the innovation (while the other guild
members obtain the status-quo proﬁts θπ/2). In this Appendix, we generalize the analysis
assuming that the surplus is shared according to a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. More speciﬁcally,
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during the period of validity of the patent, the innovating ﬁrm obtains its status—quo proﬁts
plus a share γ of the innovation surplus, π+∆−θπ; the remaining (1−γ) share is appropriated
by the other guild member(s). Parameter γ represents the bargaining power of the inventor
during the licensing negotiations. Note that γ = 1 corresponds to the baseline setting.
Below, we show that the comparative static results of the baseline setting are still valid
in this more general framework provided γ is large enough. Consider ﬁrst the case of innovation
by a guild member. The other guild member opposes the patent if
2θ(π +∆)
2
− κ >
θπ
2
+ (1− γ)(π +∆− θπ) +
θ(π +∆)
2
.
When choosing not to oppose the patent, in the ﬁrst period, the guild member obtains θπ/2+
(1−γ)(π+∆−θπ), the status-quo proﬁts plus a share (1−γ) of the innovation surplus. Hence,
opposition is optimal if
∆ > ∆ˆ(θ) =
2κ+ 2(1− γ)(1− θ)π
(θ − 2(1− γ))
.
A simple inspection of ∆ˆ(θ) reveals that d∆ˆ(θ)
dθ
< 0 : the larger is θ the more likely that guild
members oppose patents by other guild members.
Consider now the patenting decision. When ∆ ≤ ∆ˆ(θ), patenting generates an overall
proﬁt
θπ
2
+ γ(π +∆− θπ) +
θ(π +∆)
2
− c.
In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm obtains the status-quo proﬁts, θπ/2, plus the share γ of the
innovation surplus (π +∆− θπ). Hence, patenting is more proﬁtable than non-patenting only
if
θπ
2
+ γ(π +∆− θπ) +
θ(π +∆)
2
− c >
2θ(π +∆)
2
or
∆ > ∆˜(θ) =
2 (c− γπ(1− θ))
(2γ − θ)
.
Notice that ∆˜(θ) > 0 when θ and γ are large enough; moreover, d∆˜(θ)
dθ
> 0, which implies that
the propensity to patent reduces with the strength of the statutes.
Let us focus now on the case of innovation by a non-guild member. In this case, patent
opposition is proﬁtable for a guild member when
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2θ(π +∆)
2
− κ >
θπ
2
+
(1− γ)
2
(π +∆− θπ) +
θ(π +∆)
3
By accommodating the patent, in the ﬁrst period, a guild member obtains its status-quo proﬁts
plus half of (1− γ)(π +∆− θπ). Therefore, a guild member chooses to oppose a patent by an
external if
∆ > ∆ˆE(θ) =
3c− π


3γ(1− θ)− θ + 2θ2

(3γ − θ + 2θ2)
.
It can be easily veriﬁed that d∆ˆE(θ)
dθ
< 0 which implies that the larger θ the more likely is guild
members opposition to patents of external innovators.
In turn, for ∆ ≤ ∆ˆE(θ), patenting is optimal for the external innovator if
γ(π +∆− θπ) +
θ(π +∆)
3
− c > (1− θ)
2θ(π +∆)
3
,
or
∆ > ∆˜E(θ) =
3c− π


3γ(1− θ)− θ + 2θ2

(3γ − θ + 2θ2)
.
From the above expression it follows that ∆˜E(θ) < 0 if γ >
3c+πθ(1−2θ)
3π(1−θ) ; hence, the external
innovator always prefers to patent provided that γ is large enough.
Settling patent opposition
The patent opposition process described in Section 3 leads to an important ineﬃciency: patents
with large ∆ are opposed and, therefore, inventors refrain from patenting their innovations.
This fact reduces the overall surplus generated by the innovation at t = 1 from π + ∆ to
θ(π +∆). Since we are considering a game of complete information, one may wonder whether
our results are still valid when we allow for eﬃcient negotiations about the opposition decision.
To address this issue, in this Appendix we assume that, once the patent is granted, the innovator
and the guild member/s negotiate over the opposition decision. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the
innovator makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer about how to share the two-period overall surplus. If
the proposal is accepted, then the patent is not opposed; otherwise, opposition takes place.24
Suppose that the innovator is a guild member. In this case, during the negotiations the
innovator oﬀers to the other guild member an overall payoﬀ equal to θ(π+∆)/2+θ(π+∆)/2−κ,
24 In the analysis, we assume that, in case of rejection, patent opposition is proﬁtable. If this is not the case,
then the analysis of the patenting decision coincides with that presented in the baseline model when ∆ ≤ ∆(θ)
(internal innovator) or ∆ ≤ ∆E(θ) (external innovator).
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i.e. the payoﬀ that the latter would obtain in the case of opposition; clearly, such a proposal
is accepted. Hence, by choosing to patent the invention, the innovator obtains π +∆+ θ(π +
∆)− c− θ(π +∆)/2− θ(π +∆)/2 + κ = π +∆− c+ κ, a payoﬀ which does not depend on θ.
By contrast, by not patenting, the innovator obtains θ(π +∆)/2 + θ(π +∆)/2, a payoﬀ which
increases with θ. Comparing the two payoﬀs, patenting is optimal when
(1− θ)(π +∆)− c+ κ > 0
which decreases in θ. Therefore, also if we allow for negotiations over patent opposition, when
the innovator is a guild member patenting becomes less likely as θ gets larger.
Suppose now that the innovator is an outsider. During the negotiations the innovator
oﬀers the two guild members an overall payoﬀ equal to 2(θ(π +∆)/2 + θ(π +∆)/2) − κ, i.e.
the payoﬀ they would obtain jointly if one of them were to oppose the patent. By patenting
the innovator obtains a payoﬀ π +∆+ θ(π +∆)− c− 2(θ(π +∆)/2 + θ(π +∆)/2) + κ, that
is (π + ∆) (1− θ) + κ − c. By contrast, when choosing not to patent, the innovator obtains
(1− θ)2θ(π+∆)3 . Comparing the two payoﬀs, patenting is optimal when
(1− θ)
(π +∆)(3− 2θ)
3
− c+ κ > 0
a condition which is less likely to hold as θ grows larger. Therefore, also in the case of external
innovator, patenting is decreasing in θ.
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Figure 1. Venetian State Boundary  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: Knapton, 2013)   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Patents 340 1.47 5.10 0 42
Strong internal regulation 340 0.21 0.40 0 1
Distance 340 59.90 77.67 0 422.10
Trade guild 340 0.46 0.49 0 1
Guild members 169 164.06 392.27 2 3390
Main Cities
Venice 161
Verona 54
Padua 39
Brescia 31
Treviso 16
Udine 13
Others 26
Table 1. Summary statistics 
NOTES: Unit of observation is a guild i located in city j. Patents is the total number of patents
granted from 1474 to 1550 in the technology sector of the guild. Distance= distance from Venice in
Km. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has internal rules which restrict competition, grant
privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. Trade guild =1 if the guild is
not involved in manufacturing. Guild members = number of registered members as reported in the
"Istituzioni Cooperative" data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Patents Patents Patents Patents
Strong internal regulation -0.750*** -0.995*** -1.133*** -1.717***
(0.151) (0.103) (0.439) (0.610)
log(Distance) 0.224***
(0.026)
log (Guild members) 0.256
(0.191)
Trade guild -4.535*** -4.357*** -4.355*** -5.268***
(0.710) (0.708) (0.848) (1.042)
City Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 340 340 340 169
Table 2 . Guild internal regulation and patenting 
NOTES: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5
percent and *** significant at 1 percent. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has internal rules which
restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. Distance=
distance from Venice in Km. Guild members = number of registered members as reported in the "Istituzioni
Cooperative" data. Trade guild =1 if the guild is not involved in manufacturing.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
Patents 
Local
Patents 
Local
Patents 
Foreigners
Patents 
Foreigners
Patents 
Mandich
Patents 
Mandich
Strong internal regulation -0.960*** -1.098**  -0.029** -0.034* -1.372*** -1.266** 
(0.098) (0.429) (0.012) (0.020) (0.317) (0.616)
log(Distance) 0.218*** 0.006*** 0.168***
(0.025) (0.001) (0.037)
City Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340
Table 3. Inventors' origin and alternative patent data  
NOTES: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and ***
significant at 1 percent. All regressions include a dummy for Trade guilds. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has internal
rules which restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. Distance=
distance from Venice in Km. Patents local= patents granted to Italian inventors. Patents foreigners= patents granted to non-
Ital ian inventors. Columns 1-4 exploit patent data from Berveglieri (1995, 1999) columns 5-6 exploit patent data from
Mandich (1936).
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Religious confraternities and  guild internal strength
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Strong guild Patents Patents Patents
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Religious confraternity 0.150***
(0.045)
Strong internal  regulation -1.958** -4.183* -4.387**
(0.861) (2.720) (2.191) 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 340 340 340 340
First stage F-test 7.85 13.21
Instrument 
Religious 
confraternity
Probit 
regression 
NOTES: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 
percent and *** significant at 1 percent. All  regressions include a dummy for Trade guilds.  Religious 
confraternity =1 if guild is l inked to a religious institution. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has 
internal rules which restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of 
foreign members. In column 4 IV is predicted value from probit regression as in Wooldrige (2002).
 Table 5.  Noble families and patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Patents Patents Patents Patents
Strong internal regulation -1.123*** -1.199*** -1.280*** -1.111***
(0.121) (0.124) (0.128) (0.116)
log(Distance) 0.299*** 0.318*** 0.255** 0.393***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.115) (0.061)
log(Noble Families) 0.092*** 0.470*** 0.495*** 0.639***
(0.031) (0.094) (0.097)  (0.219)
log(Population1500) 0.102 -0.066 0.001 -0.353
(0.126) (0.070) (0.139) (0.295)
Politically Connected 
Families
-1.595*** -1.700*** -2.168***
(0.361) (0.375) (0.822)
log(Books) 0.146
(0.102)
City Effects No No No No
Drop Venice No No Yes No
Observations 334 334 173 334
NOTES: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent. All  regressions include a 
dummy for Trade guilds. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has internal rules which 
restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign 
members.  Distance= distance from Venice in Km. Noble families = number of noble 
families in the city as registered by Schroeder (1830). Population= inhabitants in 1500 
as estimated by Malanima (1998). Politically connected families=1 if there is at least 
one family in the city which belongs to the Great Council  or is l inked through marriages 
to a family in the Great Council. Books= number of printed books in the city in 1500, 
information from "Incunabula Short Title Catalogue".
  
 
 
Mills 
cereals 42
metals 6
textiles 9
wood saws 6
multiple usage 22
Fabrics 8
Paint 4
Bread and food 1
Pottery and Porcelain Vases 1
Agricultural machines 4
Drainage, mud removal 20
Hydraulic pumps 11
Guns 7
Arsenal 3
Mining 3
Perpetual Motion 3
Miscellaneous 19
Total 169
Table A1. Patents by technology sector 
1474-1550
Source: Berveglieri (1995)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Patents Patents
Patents 
1474-1600
Patents Patents Patents
Strong internal regulation -1.010*** -0.948** -0.728** -0.837** -1.307***
(0.098) (0.431) (0.318) (0.359) (0.486)
Placebo 0.282
(0.394)
log(Distance) 0.259***
(0.068)
log (Population1500) -0.013
(0.476)
log (Population1400) 0.176
(0.769)
log(Population 1300) -0.054
(0.383)
Apprenticeship 0.120
(0.307)
log(Age) 0.047
(0.164)
Mills 2.044***
(0.325)
City effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No Yes No No No No
Drop guilds with change in 
statute
No No No No No Yes
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 275
Table A2. Robustness 
NOTES: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and ***
significant at 1 percent. Regressions include dummy for Trade guilds. Strong internal regulation =1 if guild has
internal rules which restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members.
Placebo=1 if the statute includes: (i) a l ist of manufacturing activities precluded to women, (i i) the name of the guild's
patron saint and (ii i) a description of the hierarchical structure of the guild. Distance= distance from Venice in Km.
Population data are from Malanima (1998). Apprenticeship=1 if the "Istituzioni Corporative" database documents an
apprenticeship requirement. Age= age of the guild in 1600. Mills=1 if guild activities involve the use of mil ls. Industry
effects are dummies for guilds in agricolture, texti le and construction. Column (6) drops guilds with changes in
statutes in the period 1474-1550.
 Table A3. Exogeneity of religious origin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Religious 
confraternity
Religious 
confraternity
Religious 
confraternity
Religious 
confraternity
Age 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Age
2 
-0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Apprenticeship 0.046 0.055
(0.042) (0.042)
Number of statutory changes 1474-1550 0.022 0.041
(0.044) (0.045)
Textiles -0.062
(0.045)
Construction -0.096
(0.120)
Agriculture 0.032
(0.055)
NOTES: OLS regression with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and ***
significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable is fi l tered with city effects and a dummy for trade guilds.
Apprenticeship=1 if the "Istituzioni Corporative" database documents an apprenticeship requirement. Age= age of the
guild in 1600. Number of statutory changes 1474-1550 = number of times the statute of the guild changed during the
period 1474-1550, as reported in the "Istituzioni Cooperative" data. Textile, Construction and Agriculture are
industry dummies.
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